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In Coase's Footsteps
Douglas G. Bairdt
Retracing famous journeys is a time-honored and worthy tradi-
tion. Great explorers necessarily leave some terrain unsurveyed when
they visit new territory for the first time. As we mark the Law School's
Centennial, there is one journey especially worthy of our attention.
When he was a 20-year-old undergraduate, Ronald Coase spent the
better part of a year visiting the great industrial plants in the United
States. Out of this research emerged The Nature of the Firm,' The
Problem of Social Cost,' and much of modern law and economics.
Coase solved many mysteries that year, but, happily for the rest of us,
not all of them. One of the most intriguing arises out of the relation-
ship between General Motors and Fisher Body, one of GM's principal
suppliers.
Coase was primarily interested in what drove managers to pro-
duce something inside a firm rather than acquire it in the marketplace.
GM's acquisition of Fisher was therefore a subject of particular inter-
est to him. Fisher began as an independent firm that supplied GM
with all of its closed car bodies. In 1926, GM acquired Fisher and
thereafter produced all of its car bodies internally, along with the two
other major components of its cars (the chassis and drive train), both
of which it made largely in-house.' Hence, while interviewing GM ex-
ecutives in 1932, Coase naturally asked about the firm's acquisition of
Fisher. They told him that the need to build body plants next to GM's
assembly plants drove the decision. The conversation, however, seems
t Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago. I thank
Richard Brooks, R.H. Coase, Keith Gill, Mark Haywood, Michael Hilgers, and the staff at the
Museum of Science and Industry for their help. The ideas in this paper grow out of my long,
fruitful, and continuing collaboration with my colleague Robert Rasmussen, to whom I am, as
always, most indebted. For its support of this and many other projects, I am grateful to the John
M. Olin Foundation.
1 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
2 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
3 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, in Oliver E. Williamson and Sidney G.
Winter, eds, The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development 34, 45 (Oxford 1991)
("I should investigate long-term contracting between firms. This may in many instances be con-
sidered as an alternative to actual operating integration, and [it] seems well worth the trouble to
get any information.") (quoting from a letter Coase wrote in 1932).
4 Coase has returned to the question of GM's acquisition of Fisher Body, and his most re-
cent account sets out the basic facts. See R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General
Motors, 43 J L & Econ 15,21-27 (2000).
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to have stopped here.' Coase did not learn why they wanted body
plants next to assembly plants, or why doing this required the vertical
integration of the two firms. As it happened, other bits of evidence led
him to a new understanding of the nature of the firm, and this line of
inquiry was left untouched.
In this Essay, I return to Coase's brief conversations with these
GM executives. I attempt to discover why they answered Coase's
question the way they did, and what they might have said had they
been pressed further. My reasons are two-fold. First, economists in re-
cent years have come to use the merger of GM and Fisher as the
paradigmatic example of vertical integration. Reexamining what the
managers thought they were doing has something to offer to this on-
going debate. Second, the inquiry itself casts some light on what gives
firms value as going concerns. Understanding going-concern value-
the value that assets have if kept together inside an existing firm (and
hence what will be lost if a firm is shut down) -is central to my own
work in the law of corporate reorganizations.7 Only to the extent that
going-concern value exists can we justify a legal regime designed to
preserve firms as going concerns.
I.
By 1910, the automobile had taken the shape it was to have for
many decades. It consisted of three principal components. First, there
was the chassis, a rigid frame on which was attached the front wheels
and steering mechanism. The second major component was the drive
train. It consisted of the engine, transmission, and a drive shaft con-
nected by a differential gear to the rear wheels. The third component,
the car body, was mounted on the chassis. In the early part of the cen-
tury, the car body could be anything from an upholstered seat an-
chored on wooden floorboards to a closed body made of sheet metal.
GM acquired different types of bodies from different sources. Closed
5 See Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin at 43 (cited in note 3):
I wish I could now repeat what I was told by General Motors officials about their reasons
for acquiring Fisher Body.... My recollection is that I was told that the main reason for the
acquisition was to make sure that the body plants were located near General Motors as-
sembly plants.
6 See Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Re-
visited, 43 J L & Econ 33,34 (2000) ("The GM-Fisher case is... the most widely cited example of
vertical integration reducing problems of physical and human asset specificity, and it serves as an
empirical cornerstone for hold-up explanations of unified ownership."). This literature begins
with Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appro-
priable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J L & Econ 297,307-10 (1978).
7 See generally Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
Stan L Rev 751 (2002).
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bodies, which Fisher supplied to GM, were the most substantial and
the most expensive. Each body consisted of welded pieces of stamped
sheet metal that enclosed the passenger space and made the car suit-
able for travel in all seasons and weather.
In 1919, only about 10 percent of cars had closed bodies. By 1927,
85 percent had them. Closed bodies accounted for a much larger part
of the cost of the manufactured car than open bodies. Hence, over the
course of a few years, Fisher became the supplier of a major compo-
nent on the vast majority of cars that GM made. As closed bodies be-
came more common, General Motor's relationship with the Fisher
brothers became closer. In 1919, GM acquired 60 percent of Fisher's
equity, entered into long-term contracts with the Fisher brothers, and
established a voting trust giving each a voice in the affairs of the firm.
In 1926, Fisher was dissolved and folded into GM.9
The increasing importance of closed bodies alone does not ex-
plain why GM acquired Fisher. In many industries, a manufacturer
turns to a third party to produce an expensive component. The power
plant of the modern jetliner accounts for a large part of its value, and
aircraft makers rely on others for engines. 'O Airbus acquires its com-
ponents from many sources." GM, however, relied on Fisher to a
greater extent than aircraft manufacturers rely on their suppliers. Air-
craft manufactures have multiple vendors of crucial parts such as en-
gines and build relatively few planes slowly. Moreover, the most capi-
tal intensive components (such as engines) can be used in the aircraft
of more than one manufacturer. By contrast, GM relied on Fisher ex-
clusively for a continuous flow of goods and the parts Fisher made for
GM could not be sold to anyone else. In short, as long as Fisher re-
mained independent, each was exposing itself to a risk of hold-up by
the other. If Fisher closed or merely threatened to close its doors, GM
would be forced to close its production lines down as well, at least for
a time. Similarly, GM could threaten to seek other vendors once
Fisher invested in dies and other machinery that could be used only
for GM cars. The ability of each to hold the other hostage seemed to
8 See Alfred P Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors 152 (Doubleday 1963) (describing
the increase in percentage of sales of closed body cars for each year between 1919 and 1927).
9 See Coase, 43 J L & Econ at 22,25 (cited in note 4).
10 See Aerospace Industries Association, Aerospace Facts and Figures 2000/2001: Percent of
Civil Turbojet Engine Market by Manufacturer and Aircraft Model, online at http://www.aia-
aerospace.org/stats/facts-figures/ff-00_ol/FfOOpO86.pdf (visited Dec 2, 2002) (providing a table
showing that 100 percent of Airbus's engines are outsourced).
11 For a general discussion of the many firms that build Airbus's A320, see Tim Laming and
Robert Henson, Airbus A320 32-37 (MBI 2000).
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make vertical integration desirable once car bodies became so impor-
tant to GM's operations."
Coase quickly saw that this explanation could not withstand close
scrutiny. GM as well as other firms in the automobile industry rou-
tinely relied on outside vendors for critical parts. One could not assert
that a hold-up potential led to GM's acquisition of Fisher unless one
explained why it did not create the same problem for the other critical
vendors as well. The unsoundness of the hold-up explanation became
manifest to Coase when he visited A.O. Smith. It had one of the most
heavily automated plants in the United States. Filled with expensive
and highly specialized machinery, A.O. Smith supplied GM with car
frames. If GM could solve the potential hold-up problems that A.O.
Smith presented without bringing it inside the firm, GM should have
been able to solve them with Fisher." Moreover, Coase found that
ways of solving the hold-up problem existed apart from vertical inte-
gration." GM, for example, could retain ownership of the dies that
Fisher used to stamp sheet metal. Fisher would not have to make a
capital investment only to have GM turn to another supplier, and
GM's ownership of the dies would allow it to retrieve them in the
event that Fisher try to take advantage of it. Rejecting hold-up as the
explanation for vertical integration, Coase had to look elsewhere.
The explanation that Coase ultimately developed for vertical in-
tegration began with the idea that transaction costs, rather than ad-
vantage-taking or private information, drove the organization of pro-
duction. To present his argument in The Nature of the Firm, however,
he did not draw on the example of GM and Fisher. Nor did Coase un-
pack the explanation that GM executives offered-that they wanted
Fisher body plants to be next to GM assembly plants. In other words,
he did not squarely confront the question of what made Fisher differ-
ent from A.O. Smith. Why did the executives at GM acquire Fisher
and build their own car bodies, but never acquired A.O. Smith or build
its own automobile frames? This is the question that Coase did not
pursue and that I revisit here. The answer begins with the strategy
GM's leader, Alfred Sloan, put in place when he took the helm of GM
in the early 1920s.
Sloan was convinced that crucial to GM's success was expanding
the market share of Chevrolet, its lowest priced car." Ford held over
12 This explanation was the justification for the merger put forward by Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian, 21 J L & Econ at 308-10 (cited in note 6).
13 See Coase, 43 J L & Econ at 18 (cited in note 4).
14 See id at 45 ("[C]ontractual arrangements can be made to avoid this risk.") (quoting
from a letter written in 1932).
15 See Sloan, My Years with General Motors at 152 (cited in note 8).
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half of the domestic automobile market and, among low-price cars,
dominated both the Chevrolet and all other rivals. No one could com-
pete with the Model Ts in either durability or in price. Sloan believed
that competing effectively against the Model T was crucial to GM's
long-term success. GM developed a new Chevrolet, the K Model. It
featured a longer body, increased leg room, an improved clutch, and a
superior rear-axle housing.16 The K Model met with only modest suc-
cess initially. The price gap between it and the Model T was still too
large. The Model T continued to enjoy 70 percent of the low-priced
car market. To be successful, GM had to find a way both to improve
the quality of the K Model and produce it more cheaply.
Central to bringing this about was replacing the person in charge
of production in the Chevrolet division with "the best production man
in the United States,"'8 a man named William Knudsen. Knudsen was
empowered to make dramatic changes at Chevrolet, and he did ex-
actly this. Knudsen divided the production of automobiles into two
largely separate operations. First there was the manufacturing of the
basic components, such as the engine, the transmission, the wheels, and
so forth. Second, there was the question of assembling the component
parts. Knudsen was convinced that efficient production required a
dramatically different approach to each."
Knudsen insisted that each individual component, such as engines
and transmissions, be manufactured in only one location. Motors were
to be made in Flint. So too the axles had to be made in one place (De-
troit); the transmissions as well (Toledo). Chevrolet had long used
outside vendors and acquired parts from other divisions of GM (in-
cluding radiators, steering wheels, and ball bearings). Knudsen did not
object to continuing relationships with outside vendors, provided that
they redesign components along the lines he demanded. ° The car had
performance criteria that it needed to meet. In particular, it had to
outperform the Model T. Hence, the parts had to be at least as good as
those on the Model T. One could not use cheap steel merely because it
16 See id at 153-54.
17 The story set out here can be found in David A. Hounshell, From the American System
to Mass Production 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United
States 263-301 (Johns Hopkins 1984).
18 See Robert Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine 274 (Little, Brown 1986) (quoting
Henry Ford).
19 Knudsen's work at GM is described in Hounshell, American System at 263-301 (cited in
note 17). For Knudsen's own account, see William S. Knudsen, "For Economical Transportation":
How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production, 74 Indus Mgmt 65-68
(Aug 1927).
20 See Knudsen, 74 Indus Mgmt at 68 (cited in note 19).
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was cheap, especially not where the Model T used vanadium steel al-
loys.
Knudsen was content, at least initially, to leave Fisher's manufac-
turing operations untouched. The principal change Knudsen brought
about in GM's relationship with Fisher grew out of his approach to as-
sembly of automobile components, not the manufacture of individual
components.21 Automobile components are easy to ship in bulk, while
finished cars are not. Moreover, while economies of scale exist in
manufacturing automobile components such as engines and frames,
there are relatively fewer in assembling cars once a model is produced
in sufficient volume and the method for assembling the car has been
refined and documented. Assembly plants consist of large open fac-
tory floors with conveyers and pulleys that bring the pieces to the cor-
rect place. They were not expensive to build or replicate." Moreover,
as long as the delivery of components was properly coordinated, the
assembly of the cars required little in the way of skilled labor. The ba-
sic philosophy of mass production is the manufacture of component
parts to high tolerances. If this was done properly, the assembly of the
car itself required no special expertise." Assembly of automobiles did
not depend upon expert fitters who assembled the parts to shape them
so that they worked together. "In mass production there are no fit-
ters."2 The costs associated with building assembly plants and the costs
of hiring and supervising the largely unskilled workforce were lower
than the cost of transporting finished cars across long distances.
Capturing these savings at Chevrolet, however, required Knudsen
to change GM's relationship with Fisher. Fisher could continue to
stamp the different pieces of sheet metal at its own factories. These
stamped parts, like other auto components, could be shipped at low
cost. But assembling the pieces into the automobile body was a differ-
21 Again, after Knudsen himself, Hounshell provides the best account of the transforma-
tion of Chevrolet during the 1920s. See Hounshell, American System at 266 (cited in note 17)
(describing Chevrolet under Knudsen in the 1.920s).
22 See James M. Rubenstein, Making and Selling Cars: Innovation and Change in the US.
Automotive Industry 18-23 (Johns Hopkins 2001). The failure to understand the dramatic differ-
ence between the capital costs (including human capital) of manufacturing of components on the
one hand and their assembly on the other is the primary failing of those who have studied GM's
acquisition of Fisher. A conspicuous exception is Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F
Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J L & Econ 67 (2000) (emphasizing that coordination of
production and not asset specificity drove the merger).
23 The parts of the Model T were engineered and milled to such fine tolerances that the
motor itself was not run until the car was completely assembled. There were not even test drives
to ensure the car worked. See Fred H. Colvin, Building an Automobile Every 40 Seconds, Am
Machinist 757,761 (May 8,1913); Hounshell, American System at 234 (cited in note 17) (discuss-
ing the Ford plant's assembly workers).
24 See Henry Ford, Mass Production, in 30 Encyclopedia Britannica 821,822 (1926), online
at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/coolhtml/coolbibTitlesO3.html (visited Jan 24, 2003).
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ent matter. Like a finished car, a completed car body is expensive to
ship and subject to dents and other damage en route. Moreover, stor-
ing an inventory of assembled car bodies was a nontrivial problem.
Stamped pieces of sheet metal can be stacked; welded car bodies can-
not be. Every eyewitness to these assembly plants marveled not at the
physical plant itself, but rather the level of organization needed to en-
sure the steady flow of more than a million pounds of material each
day that kept the assembly line in operation.5
Knudsen insisted that Fisher adopt the same practices for assem-
bling car bodies as he instituted for the different components of the
chassis and drive train. Fisher could stamp the sheet metal anywhere,
but the bodies themselves had to be welded together at a factory adja-
cent to the auto assembly plant. The two plants were to be connected
with a system of dollies and conveyers. The cost of making this change
was modest. The cost of shifting the location in Fisher's car body as-
sembly plants required a capital investment of about $5 million. This
was a trivial sum compared with Chevrolet's annual operating ex-
penses of half a billion dollars." Body assembly plants, like auto as-
sembly plants, require little more than open factory space and a con-
veyor system. There is almost no asset specialization." Moreover, it
was easy enough for GM to pay for building the facility and then lease
the space to Fisher." In short, with Knudsen's arrival at Chevrolet
what changed was not asset-specific investment by Fisher in Chevro-
let, but rather the way Fisher conducted its day-to-day operations.
Knudsen brought to Chevrolet a production strategy that re-
sulted in a world in which a large part of Fisher's operations were
physically joined with Chevrolet's. Controls had to be put in place to
ensure that each day the proper number of engines, transmissions, and
frames were delivered to the assembly plant. At the same time, a cor-
responding assortment of stamped sheet metal (as dictated by Knud-
sen) had to arrive at the adjacent Fisher assembly plant. At the same
time the components for the chassis and the drive train were brought
together at the Chevrolet plant, the pieces of sheet metal forming the
body of the relevant model had to be rolled on a dolly from the Fisher
25 See Colvin, Building an Automobile Every 40 Seconds at 759 (cited in note 23).
26 See Coase, 43 J L & Econ at 29 (cited in note 4).
27 See Sloan, My Years with General Motors at 154-55 (cited in note 8).
28 See Rubenstein, Making and Selling Cars at 101 (cited in note 22).
29 See Coase, 43 J L & Econ at 28 (cited in note 4) ("[I]t was normal for the expenditures
for capital equipment dedicated to the use of one customer to be borne by that customer."). With
regard to GM and Fisher specifically "it was agreed that ... it would be better for General Mo-
tors Corporation to own the assembly plants, leasing them to the Fisher Company." Id at 29
(quotations omitted).
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plant and deposited at the appointed place in the Chevrolet assembly
line.
Completely central to Knudsen's view of production was the idea
of central planning and engineering. The center directed each of the
managers as to how many cars to make each month and ensured that
the necessary components were shipped. Changes or alterations were
cleared through the center. One central authority decided how many
of which model would be made at each Fisher/Chevrolet assembly lo-
cation each month. At each location, Fisher and Chevrolet had to co-
ordinate minute-by-minute operations. A stranger visiting any site
would likely not see any separation between Fisher's operations and
Chevrolet's. In short, Knudsen's decisions about how to produce the
Chevrolet required seamlessly integrating Fisher's body assembly op-
eration with GM's own auto assembly operation.
Knudsen's scheme did not require the creation of a single entity
as a legal matter. It is possible to imagine that Fisher and GM could
have continued to coordinate through contract even if the acquisition
had not taken place. In the nineteenth century, for example, it was
common for factory owners to hire independent jobbers who supplied
the labor force.3 An assembly line with two separate owners is like a
railroad between two cities with half the track being owned by one
firm and half by another. Such things have precedent. (The Central
Pacific and the Union Pacific being the most obvious example.31) All
the issues of coordination can (and indeed for some period of time
were) solved through contract. Nevertheless, one suspects that once
the two operations became so closely integrated, GM's complete ac-
quisition of Fisher was the logical next step.32
From the perspective of an economist interested in how goods
are produced and the extent to which operations take place in the
market or through command and control inside the firm, the integra-
tion of Fisher and Chevrolet took place before acquisition. GM's ac-
quisition of Fisher Body in 1926 was not the main event. Indeed, the
acquisition may have had almost no effect on the way in which Chev-
rolet interacted with Fisher at the plant level. Many of the decisions,
30 The use of jobbers seems to have declined only when increasing economies of scale also
required greater control over each detail of the assembly process. See Hounshell, American Sys-
tem at 120 (cited in note 17) (discussing outside contracting of manufacturing products).
31 For an account of the political forces that allowed these two firms to run the first trans-
continental railroad, see David Haward Bain, Empire Express: Building The First Transcontinen-
tal Railroad 104-18 (Viking 1999).
32 Sloan himself thought of the merger in exactly this way. See Sloan, My Years with Gen-
eral Motors at 161 (cited in note 8) ("There were operating economies to be gained by co-
ordinating body and chassis assemblies, and with the closed body becoming dominant in the in-
dustry, it seemed sensible to bring the body operation entirely under the General Motors roof").
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such as the way in which the managers of any two assembly opera-
tions coordinated their work, were unaffected.
II.
We can return then to the puzzle that Coase left unanswered:
How was Fisher different from A.O. Smith? The answer is straightfor-
ward: Completed car bodies (which Fisher supplied) were expensive
to ship and hard to store, but automobile frames (which A.O. Smith
supplied) could be shipped and stored easily. Efficient manufacture
required coordination of the assembly of the body with the assembly
of the rest of the car. The assembly of the frame required no such co-
ordination. The reasons for bringing Fisher within GM's orbit had
nothing to do with asset-specificity and everything to do with minimiz-
ing production costs. Even when one retraces old journeys many dec-
ades later the basic landscape does not change.
GM, and more specifically Chevrolet, reorganized its production
in the 1920s with a view to capturing the same efficiencies as Ford.
Doing this required a dramatic increase in the level of cooperation be-
tween GM and Fisher, to the extent of building factories next to one
another and ensuring production in each were seamlessly coordinated.
Indeed, relocating Fisher's assembly operation made Fisher more in-
tegrated with Chevrolet than suppliers inside GM itself, even before
the merger in 1926. Chevrolet's source of radiators provides a good
illustration.
In 1925, Chevrolet used radiators from Harrison, a wholly-owned
division of GM. As a matter of legal form, interactions with Harrison
were inside a single legal entity, while those with Fisher were not.
Chevrolet could have acquired its radiators as easily from a third-
party vendor as from Harrison. Moreover, it could readily switch from
Harrison to another source of supply at little cost or acquire its radia-
tors from multiple sources. Nothing in the way Chevrolet organized its
production required close cooperation from Harrison. Neither Knud-
sen nor anyone else at Chevrolet had the control over Harrison's op-
erations that remotely resembled the control they had over Fisher's.
The control rights Chevrolet acquired by both contract and its long-
term relationship made Fisher's assembly operations much more a
part of the Chevrolet "firm" than Harrison ever was even before ver-
tical integration occurred.
III.
The distinction between activity inside a firm and outside is use-
ful. But drawing a line between the two is often hard. Moreover, draw-
ing this line by identifying the different legal entities engaged in a par-
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ticular economic activity is often misleading. Vertical integration may
bring no change at all in the way two entities interact with each other.
The firm-market boundary can be unaffected. The question of how
economic activity is organized is separate from the question of which
legal entities own which assets. Vertical integration in the case of GM
and Fisher had only a modest effect on the way in which Fisher actu-
ally built its car bodies. Another merger in the early history of the
Ford Motor Company points to the same conclusion.
In 1903, Henry Ford was a failure. He formed the Detroit Motor
Company in 1901 and ran it into the ground. He then founded the
Henry Ford Company and was thrown out when he proved incapable
of bringing his car designs into production. He started the Ford Motor
Company, his third company, on a shoestring. He had little money of
his own and, given his track record, little ability to raise it from anyone
else. He started with only $28,0003 and had only $223 left before sell-
ing his first car." Nevertheless, by 1909 Ford was rich and poised to be-
come rich beyond dreams of avarice." What did Ford do between 1903
and 1909 to acquire so much wealth? And, crucial for our purposes,
how much of this value was embedded in the Ford Motor Company?
Henry Ford had three qualities that separated him from the hun-
dreds of others who formed car companies at the start of the twenti-
eth century. First, Ford was a great designer of cars. In the first years of
the century, no one else designed cars so well. Whatever other failings
he had (and there were many), no one doubted his ability to design
cars. The car he designed at the Henry Ford Company (his second
company) was among the best of its time. The car the company ulti-
mately produced (renamed Cadillac) was successful in large measure
because Ford was its designer.
6
But Ford's greatest car design was the Model T. Before the Model
T, cars were still wagons with engines attached. The Model T consisted
of a single rigid metal frame, to which the drive train was affixed in
only three places. The car was at once light, flexible, and durable. Ford
used exotic alloys to reduce the weight of the car further still. The en-
gine, transmission, and magneto were enclosed within a single housing
that protected them from the elements. Every part of the car was de-
33 See Horace Lucien Arnold and Fay Leone Faurote, Ford Methods and the Ford Shops
13-14 (Engineering Magazine 1919). The Ford Motor Company started with a capital stock of
$100,000 but only $28,000 cash was paid in at the beginning.
34 See Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 74 (cited in note 18) (discussing Ford's
early finances).
35 See id at 94, 147-48.
36 See Arthur Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-
Five Years 1908-1933 103 (Doubleday 1934) ("[The] chief guide and mainstay in the mechanical
department [was] no less a person than Henry Ford.").
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signed to be assembled, operated, and maintained easily.37 Many cars
of the time were much more expensive, but, putting "extras" such as
lavish appointments to one side, it was the finest car ever made." It
was the first modern automobile, a durable, efficient machine that
took people on rugged dirt roads wherever they wanted to go.
Ford's second extraordinary quality was his willingness to bet big.
Before the Model T, the Ford Motor Company's cars had been suc-
cessful and had made Ford a millionaire. At the start, the company
farmed out all of its manufacturing operations. Ford oversaw a small
assembly operation. He spent $384 on parts for each car, but only $20
on the labor needed to assemble each car," and he could have com-
fortably remained on that course. Instead, he took all the money he
had made to date and risked everything on the Model T. He gambled
that he could take this car, produce it for much less than anyone
thought possible, and persuade millions to buy it. At a time when most
thought cars were merely playthings for the rich, Ford believed that a
car could be built that was so useful that ordinary people would give
up the greater part of a year's salary to own one.
The Model T was a huge success, and the patent protection Ford
won for some crucial elements of Model T design made it hard for
others to follow his lead.4° Hence, Ford had several years to enjoy the
benefit of designing the Model T and betting that it would find com-
mercial acceptance. But Ford's willingness to bet big and his design do
not explain how Ford came to dominate the automobile industry be-
tween 1912 and 1925. The Model T was a revolutionary car in 1908,
but it was essentially unchanged in 1912. Nothing prevented others
from producing a car much like the Model T. The patents did not fore-
close other low-cost designs. Nor did Ford possess any secret manufac-
turing techniques. Ford allowed anyone to visit his plant and see ex-
actly how he produced the car.4 Anyone who wanted to could design a
37 For a comprehensive account of the Model T, its components, and how to repair and re-
place them, see Victor W. Pag6, Model T Ford Car: Including Fordson Farm Tractor (Henley rev
ed 1925).
38 See Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 95 (cited in note 18) ("There was scarcely
a component of the Model T which did not contain some fresh development to excite automo-
tive enthusiasts, but the guiding theme of all of them was simplicity...
39 See id at 73 (discussing the Model T's production costs).
40 There were eight patents covering the Model T. The most important was the U.S. Patent
No 1,012,620, which covered the way in which the drive train was connected to the chassis. For a
discussion of the advantages of this connection, see Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and the
Ford Shops at 20-21 (cited in note 33).
41 See Ford Factory Facts 5 (Ford 1915) ("The Ford Motor Company is pleased to extend
to all visitors the privilege of an inspection of its plant."). The American Machinist carried a se-
ries of articles on Ford's manufacturing techniques in 1913. See, for example, Colvin, Building an
Automobile Every 40 Seconds at 757 (cited in note 23). Another series that appeared in the En-
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car like the Model T and copy Ford's production methods. Nor did
manufacture of such a car require investments of capital that were out
of reach of the many others in the industry in 1913. Indeed, at this
point, Ford's entire capital investment in his physical plant and
equipment was less than $10 million, at a time when his annual operat-
ing expenses were $74 million and his revenues were more than $89
million.'2
What prevented others from competing with Ford after they saw
the Model T and the success it enjoyed? Why did it take fifteen years
before someone like Knudsen came along to reorganize the produc-
tion of the K Model Chevrolet and produce a competitive alternative
to the Model T? Ford's gifts as a designer and his willingness to gam-
ble do not explain this part of the story. Ford enlisted others to help
him in designing the Model T. One of the revolutionary features of the
Model T (encasing the drive train) was not his or his employees', but
rather that of a team of engineers at a sheet metal stamping firm in
Buffalo called Keim Mills. 3 Ford himself had little expertise in sheet
metal stamping. Moreover, at this period, the presses used to stamp
sheet metal and the dies needed to fabricate any given part were hard
to replicate. Ford had greater reason to ensure that he had control
over the assets dedicated to the production of the Model T than those
at Chevrolet fifteen years later.
But the value Ford derived from Keim Mills stemmed only in
small part from the specialized assets. More important was the help he
enjoyed from the engineers who worked there. Ford's success between
1909 and 1925 came from the team of engineers who surrounded him.
They devised thousands of ways to produce the Model T more effi-
ciently, more cheaply, and in greater volume. Most of the production
innovations Ford's team put in place came from organizing the flow of
production. The Ford team took each step and each part and figured
out how to rearrange the work and redesign the component to make it
better and cheaper." The moving assembly line (put in place in 1913,
gineering Magazine in 1915 was later published as a book. See Arnold and Faurote, Ford Meth-
ods and the Ford Shops (cited in note 33).
42 See Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods and the Ford Shops at 25 (cited in note 33)
($3.575 million on buildings, tanks, and fixtures through February 1914 and $2.8 million on
equipment); id at 3 (revenues of $89.1 million in 1913); id at 1 (profits of $15 million per year).
43 See Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 94-95 (cited in note 18).
44 The idea that the Model T never changed is an illusion. A practiced eye can tell the date
of manufacture of any particular Model T within a few years at a glance. With only a little more
study, one can narrow it down to a few months. See Bruce W. McCalley, Model T Ford: The Car
that Changed the World 11 (Krause 1994).
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fully five years after the Model T entered production ' ) was the most
striking innovation, but it was only one of many.
Ford became rich in large part because his team worked unusu-
ally well together, and they created efficiencies in mass production
that had never been seen before, both by refining old production
techniques and putting in place new ones. Ford's design gifts, his vi-
sion, and his patents gave him a head start over potential rivals. The
team ensured that he kept his lead. Month by month they found small
improvements in the car and especially its method of manufacture.
Imagine an entrepreneur who set out to build a car comparable
to Ford's Model T. With a modest amount of capital and good design
skills and a competent production team, he could reverse engineer the
car, design around the patents, and imitate Ford's production practices.
Within six months or a year's time, he might bring to market a car that
was as good as the one Ford produced the year before. But it would be
too late. He would discover that he was competing against a slightly
better Model T, the price of which had fallen by 10 percent. To be
more precise, the Model T (Touring) had a factory price of $600 in
1913, $550 in 1914, $490 in 1915, $440 in 1916, and $360 in 1917.4 The
Ford Motor Company, as a collection of physical assets, was not worth
much. As long as Ford had his engineering drawings, the necessary
gauges, his patents, and his team, little else mattered. His factory could
burn to the ground, all but a handful of employees could quit, and the
value of what Ford owned would be remarkably unaffected.
The Ford Motor Company owned the Model T design and the in-
formation needed to build it. But the corporation did not own the
team. Indeed, some of the most important member's of the team
worked for Keim Mills and not for Ford at all.4'7 For a period of time,
the contracts and relationship between Ford Motor and Keim Mills
and between Keim Mills and its engineers were satisfactory. Ulti-
mately, Ford acquired Keim Mills, and it became a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Ford. But the major event (and the one that had the greatest
consequences for the long-term success of Ford) came after Ford ac-
quired Keim Mills.
The unskilled workers who ran the stamping presses at Keim
Mills thought that they had the ability to hold-up Ford. They were
sadly mistaken. When they went on strike, Ford promptly shut the en-
45 See id (the first Model T was manufactured in 1908); Rubenstein, Making and Selling
Cars at 18-19 (cited in note 22) (describing the first moving production line in 1913).
46 See McCalley, Model T Ford: The Car that Changed the World at 141, 171,193, 195, 231
(cited in note 44).
47 See Hounshell, American System at 234 (cited in note 17) (describing the Keim Mills
team).
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tire firm down. Just as a contract could have been written that vested
title in the stamping presses in Ford, Keim's status as a wholly-owned
subsidiary gave him the same power. Ford immediately dissolved
Keim Mills and moved all the stamping presses to Detroit. More im-
portantly, he was able to persuade the senior team at Keim Mills to
move to Detroit as well. Here what mattered was not whether Keim
Mills was independent or wholly-owned, but whether Henry Ford's
powers of persuasion were sufficient to keep his team together. The
value of an enterprise resides in large measure in the team that runs
it. The most important contributions of the Keim Mills team came
from their skill in organizing automobile production, not from their
expertise with respect to stamping metal parts or any other specialized
skill. It was, for example, one of them that created the incentive com-
pensation system that allowed Henry Ford to boast that he paid his
workers $5 a day.I
The value of a team, however, is independent of the legal entity
that employs them. Ford became rich because he was able to assemble
a great team and keep it together. It is not surprising that ultimately
the team became Ford employees, just as it is not surprising that GM
ultimately acquired Fisher. But again the formal legal event did not
coincide with the events that mattered. The members of the Keim
Mills team designed the Model T well before vertical integration, and
their later contributions came only when they moved from Buffalo to
Detroit, an event that took place after vertical integration and that did
not depend on it.
IV.
The production of the Model T Ford and the K Model Chevrolet
are two important events in the early history of the automobile indus-
try. They were both great success stories in which Keim Mills and
Fisher Body played crucial roles. They also present two instances in
which an upstream supplier ultimately became a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of its principal buyer. In the case of GM, efficient production
required command and control over a large part of Fisher Body's op-
erations. The assembly of car bodies from individual pieces of sheet
48 For an account of this episode, see Lacey, Ford: The Men and the Machine at 106 (cited in
note 18). It may be no accident that Ford Motor lost its primacy as the Keim Mills team deserted
Henry Ford. Its members included William Knudsen, the production man Ford himself thought
the best in the business. See note 18 and accompanying text.
49 Faced with extraordinary employee turnover, one of the Keim Mills team (John Lee) in-
stituted a new wage structure. He maintained a base pay of $2.34, but a worker could earn $5 a
day if they worked for 6 months and qualified in other respects. See Lacey, Ford: The Men and
the Machine at 117-18 (cited in note 18) (describing Ford's employee pay rates).
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metal requires little in the way of specialized assets or capital, but the
control the automobile assembler has over the operation in mass pro-
duction ensures that the two operations are part of the same firm in
the economic sense. In the case of Ford, vertical integration is one part
of a story connected with acquisition of human capital. Vertical inte-
gration helped Ford keep the Keim Mills team, but the team existed
before vertical integration, and its full value came after vertical inte-
gration only when the team moved to Detroit. That vertical integra-
tion as a legal matter occurred in each case is unsurprising, but logi-
cally distinct from the events that brought assets inside the "firm" in
the economic sense.
The formal event that marks vertical integration as a legal matter
corresponds only imperfectly with whether activity takes place inside
or outside the firm. As costs of doing business in the market and in the
firm fall, however, we should expect the stakes involved in locating
production inside or outside a firm should fall as well. As we retrace
Coase and then ask about the implications of his work in the issues we
confront today, we might well conclude that the boundary between
firms and markets will become increasingly permeable. For econo-
mists, the lesson is straightforward. They should resist, to a much
greater extent than they have, the temptation to turn to the law to
identify the firm.
For lawyers, the lesson is more subtle and the challenge harder.
As we regulate economic activity, we must resist the idea that the lo-
cus of economic activity rests with a discrete legal entity. A lawmaker
charged with ensuring that those who assembled Chevrolets complied
with applicable law had to ensure that the rules worked equally well
when the same configuration of assets was run by two legal entities as
by one. Thinking about legal regulation of economic activity has too
readily assumed that one can solve problems by imposing legal duties
on firms. In a world in which the boundaries of the firm become less
clear and the identity of those who control the firm becomes more
fluid, regulations that focus on the conduct of specific firms is at best
incomplete and often misguided. We are likely to encounter even
greater problems in regulating behavior. No longer are the entities
providing the goods or services long-lived, atomistic firms with a read-
ily identifiable governance structure. When we want to use legal rules
to advance some broader social goal inconsistent with the interests of
those who own the enterprise, we shall be increasingly less able to do
it by imposing obligations and duties on firms and those who invest in
them. To the extent that it is still possible in a global economy, effec-
tive legal rules will increasingly focus on regulating economic activity,
rather than on regulating distinct legal entities.
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